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NOTES
THE ROLE OF STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN
TITLE VII CASES
In two decisions handed down on the same day, the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the requirements for establishing and rebutting a
prima facie case of employment discrithination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964) One case involved objective and facially nondis-
criminatory job qualification standards and the other subjective and rela-
tively standardless hiring procedures, and the Court faced problems of
proof peculiar to each. 2 In spite of their differences, however, each case
emphasized the importance of the proper use of statistical evidence.
The hiring standards challenged in Dothard v. Rawlinson 3 were objec-
tive and facially neutral. The plaintiff alleged that Alabama's statutory job
qualifications, which set minimum height and weight requirements for
prison guards, excluded a disproportionate number of women. 4 The
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 Employers sued under Title VII generally fall into two categories. The first group
consists of those who promulgate objective and inflexible job qualification standards which are
alleged to have a discriminatory impact on minority applicants. Examples of such hiring
criteria include a requirement of a high school degree or a passing score on a standardized in-
telligence test. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971). The second
category consists of employers who use subjective and discretionary hiring procedures. These
employers pose a difficult problem for the courts, since it is not always possible to determine
why a particular applicant, or group of applicants, was not hired or promoted. See, e.g., Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (racial discrimination in the
trucking industry).
The Supreme Court has recognized a dichotomy in Title VII cases which bears some
similarity to the distinction between objective and subjective hiring procedures presented here.
In a footnote to its decision in Teamsters, the Court observed:
"Disparate treatment" such as alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination, The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be in-
ferred from the mere fact of difference in treatment....
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neu-
tral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.... Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate impact
theory.. , . Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of hicts.
431 U.S. at 335-36 11.15.
Cases involving objective hiring criteria will almost always be tried under what the
Court calls a "disparate impact" theory. The plaintiff will allege that facially neutral job qual-
ification standards have a discriminatory impact on a group protected by Title VII. However,
when a plaintiff challenges the subjective and discretionary aspect of a hiring procedure, he
may employ either theory. Generally, as in Teamsters, the plaintiff will allege that the employer
is guilty of "disparate treatment" of a protected class. However, the plaintiff may also argue,
under-a "disparate impact" theory, that the employer's facially neutral, though subjective, hir-
ing procedure operates to exclude members of a protected class disproportionately, If the
plaintiff' uses this latter theory, he will not be required to prove that the defendant had dis-
criminatory motives or intentions. See generally Blumrusen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the. Concept of Employment' Discrimination, 71 Moat. L. REV. 59, 92-93 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Biumrosen].
3 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 324.
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employment practices challenged in Hazelwood School District v. United Slates 5
were subjective and not based on readily quantifiable criteria. The Gov-
ernment argued that the Hazelwood School District's highly discretionary
procedure for hiring teachers was operated by the defendants to exclude a
disproportionate number of black applicants.°
Though the Court did not explicitly draw a distinction between Title
VII suits involving objective job qualification standards and those dealing
with more subjective aspects of a hiring procedure, a comparison of Dothard
and Hazelwood suggests that the requirements for establishing and rebutting
a prima facie case, can vary significantly, depending on the kind of hiring
procedure employed by the defendant. Of particular importance is the
Court's discussion of the use of statistics in the two cases. In addition, be-
cause Dothard and Hazelwood represent relatively clear examples of two dif-
ferent types of Title VII cases, they shed considerable light on the Court's
view of the options available to the plaintiff and the defendant in Title VII
actions generally. The two decisions also highlight some of the difficulties
inherent in employment discrimination suits which rely heavily on statistical
proof.
This note will discuss the proof requirements of Title VII in light of
the Supreme Court decisions in Dothard and Hazelwood. The facts of each
case will be presented, together with separate discussions of the require-
ments suggested by the Court for establishing and rebutting a prima facie
case of employment discrimination in each case. The two decisions will then
be compared with a view toward discerning the similarities and differences
between cases involving objective job qualification standards and those in
which the defendant has employed more subjective hiring procedures.
I. DOTHARD AND OBJECTIVE HIRING CRITERIA
In Dothard, the Court was asked to consider a challenge to dearly-
defined, objective hiring criteria. The challenged criteria were contained in
an Alabama statute which required prison guards to meet certain minimum
height and weight requirements. Diana Rawlinson was a college graduate
whose major course of study was correctional psychology.' She applied for
a job as a prison guard with the Alabama Board of Corrections, but was re-
jected because she failed to meet the height and weight minima.° She then
filed a class action suit in federal district court, alleging that the height and
weight standards were violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 9
The plaintiff alleged that Alabama's requirement that prison guards
weigh at least 120 pounds and be at least 5 feet 2 inches tall excluded a
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
8 1d, at 306-07 & n.12.
' Dothard v. Mieth, 418 F. Supp, 1169, 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
8 ALA CODE, tit. 55, 373 (109) (Supp. 1973), provides that all applicants and appointees
for prison guard positions be at least 5'2" tall and weigh at least 120 lbs. 418 F. Supp. at 1178.
Rawlinson's application was rejected because of her weight. Id.
9
 418 F. Supp. at 1178-79. The named party was originally Brenda Mieth, Rawlinson's
co-plaintiff, who challenged height and weight requirements for the position of Alabama State
Trooper as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A three-
judge district court ruled against Alabama on this constitutional issue. Id. at 1172. The state
did not appeal. See 433 U.S. at 324 nn.4 & 5.
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disproportionate percentage of women. Her prima facie case was founded
almost. entirely on two types of statistics. Initially, she compared the per-
centage of women prison guards (12.9%) with the percentage of women in
Alabama's total labor force (36.89%), and concluded that women were
underrepresented." She then introduced National Census figures which
showed that the height and weight minima would exclude 33.29% of the
women in the United States between the ages of 18 and 79 while excluding
only 1.28% of men between the same ages." In response, the defendants
challenged the probative value of general census statistics, and they de-
fended the height and weight minima as a job-related "business neces-
sity." 12
 A three-judge district court'' found for the plaintiff. 14
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had adequately
demonstrated the discriminatory impact of the height and weight minima
to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII,• and that the defendants'
attempt to show that the hiring standards were job-related had failed to
rebut this prima facie case.'" Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the
Court, reaffirmed the view first expressed by the Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co." that job qualification standards which disproportionately
exclude members of a protected class can violate Title VII whether or not
there is any evidence that the defendant intended to discriminate."' The
Court's opinon focused on whether the national population statistics intro-
duced by the plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated such an impact on female
applicants. The defendants had argued that such "generalized national
statistics should not suffice to establish a prima facie case," but rather that
the plaintiff should have been required to introduce figures regarding
"actual applicants for [prison guard] positions."'"
The Court disagreed, Justice Stewart observing that there is "no re-
quirement that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must al-
ways be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants."'" The
Court noted that applicant data might not accurately indicate the dis-
criminatory effect of the hiring criteria at issue, since a "potential applicant.
could easily measure her height and weight and conclude that to make an
application would be futile." 2 ' Therefore, the Court concluded, the plain-
'" 418 F. Supp. at 1178-79.
" Id. at 1179.
' 2 Id. at 1182. See notes and text at notes 35-37 infra.
' I See note 9 supra.
' 4
 418 F. Stipp. at 1183-84,
12 433 U.S. at 332. The plaintiff in Duthard had also challenged an Alabama regulation
which explicitly excluded women from certain "contact positions" in state maximum security
institutions. The Court found that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for these po-
sitions, and therefore rejected the plaintiff's claim on this issue. Id. at 335-37. See Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam); id. at 542 (Marshall, J., con-
curring); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v, Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). This issue will not be further dis-
cussed in this note.
'" Id. at 331-32.
12
 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
1 " 433 U.S. at 329.
"Id. at 330.
"Id,
21 Id. Justice Stewart also observed that national population statistics were sufficient be-
cause, since the case involved physical characteristics, there was "no reason to suppose" that
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tiff had introduced enough evidence to warrant an inference of sex dis-
crimination and had established a prima facie violation of Title VII.
The defendants had attempted to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case
by proving that the height and weight requirements had a relationship to
strength, "a sufficient but unspecified amount of which is essential to effec-
tive job performance" as a prison guard. 22 Because the defendants had
presented virtually no evidence at trial to support this assertion, the Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court that Alabama had failed to prove its
hiring criteria were job-related. 23
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case
The Court in Dothard, following other decisions involving objective job
qualification standards, 24
 held that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case
by demonstrating that Alabama's hiring standards had a disproportionate
and discriminatory impact on a protected class. 22 As in Dothard, the plaintiff
generally carries this burden by using statistics to demonstrate: I) that the
group in question is underrepresented in the defendant's work force; and
2) that this underrepresentation is a result of the defendant's hiring stan-
dards. 20
 In order to establish this latter allegation, the plaintiff introduces
statistics which justify a reasonable inference that the defendant's hiring
criteria disproportionately exclude actual or potential minority applicants."
As the Court observed in Dothard, a comparison between characteristics of
the general population and members of the excluded group may be highly
probative in supporting this inference.
B. Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie violation of Title VII,
the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut any inferences of discrimina-
tion. Dothard dealt with two methods of rebuttal: the defendant can intro-
duce evidence which demonstrates that inferences of discrimination based
on the statistics offered by the plaintiff are unwarranted," or the defen-
dant can establish that its objective hiring criteria are a "business necessity,"
essential for effective job performance."
The Dothard Court observed that once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case with reference to general statistical proof, the defendant
has the burden of coming forward with "countervailing evidence of his
own" regarding "fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plain-
tiff."3° The employer can, for example, attempt to demonstrate that the
analysis of a more narrowly defined population would yield a different result in demonstrat-
ing the discriminatory impact of the height and weight minima. Id.
22 1d. at 331.
23 1d. at 331-32.
"See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
25
 433 U.S. at 329-31.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 330.
" See id. (citing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436).
30 Id. at 331. See id. at 338-39 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result and concurring in
part). Some of this evidence regarding deficiencies in the plaintiff's statistical proof would not,
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plaintiff's statistics are too general to provide even an approximation of the
effect of the challenged hiring standards. But whether such an assertion, in
and of itself, is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case is doubtful where the
plaintiff has employed the best statistics available."
The defendant might also introduce evidence regarding actual appli-
cants for the job in question, in an effort to demonstrate that hiring stan-
dards which were discriminatory in theory did not actually operate to
exclude minority applicants unlawfully. 32 If such evidence were available,
the defendants in Dothard might have introduced statistics showing that a
reasonable percentage of women applicants for prison guard positions had
been hired, and that the scarcity of women in the defendants' work force
was the result of the fact that few had applied for the prison guard job.
Dothard does not directly discuss the probative value of this kind of evi-
dence when introduced to rebut a prima facie case, but the majority opin-
ion does suggest that data regarding actual applicants may be misleading
and unreliable. In discussing why the plaintiff will not be required to in-
troduce statistics regarding actual applicants to establish a prima facie case,
Justice Stewart observed:
The application process might not adequately reflect the actual
potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might be
discouraged from applying because of a self-recognized inability
to meet the very standards challenged as being discriminatory. 33
Thus if height and weight minima will likely dissuade women from apply-
ing for jobs as prison guards, applicant data would appear to have very lit-
tle probative value whether introduced to establish or to rebut a prima
facie case of employment discrimination.
This conclusion applies to most cases involving objective, facially-
neutral job qualification standards. The focus of the statistical analysis must
be on the potential applicant pool, and not simply on those who actually
applied for the job in question. Defendants who wish to rebut a prima fade
showing of discrimination by introducing statistics regarding actual appli-
cants will, by this reasoning, have little success. 34
Because the Court appears reluctant to consider challenges to the use
of general population statistics in cases involving objective hiring criteria,
defendants will likely attempt to prove that their hiring standards are job-
related. The Court has suggested two basic requirements for establishing
that facially-neutral, objective standards are job-related. First, the job qual-
ification (e.g., height and weight requirements) must correlate extremely
closely with the associated characteristics which are desired (e.g.,
strength). 35 Second, the associated characteristics must be essential, not
strictly speaking, constitute a rebuttal to a prima fade case, but rather would represent a chal-
lenge to the sufficiency of a prima facie case.
3 ' See note 21 supra.
32 In his dissenting opinion, Justice White suggests that the plaintiff be required either
to show that applicant statistics will not be reliable or to introduce such statistics in order to
establish a prima facie case, Id. at 348-49 (White, J., dissenting). The Court avoids imposing
any such requirements on the plaintiff, and implies that it is the defendant's option to intro-
duce such evidence if the plaintiff has nut done so. See id, at 330-31.
33 1d. at 330 (emphasis added).
" See Blumrosen, supra note 2, at 92.
" See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
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merely convenient, for effective job performance. 36 Both points must be es-
tablished in order to rebut a prima fade case of employment discrimination
on the grounds that the defendant's hiring standards are a "business neces-
sity." In Dothard, the defendants' claim that Alabama's height and weight
minima were related to the amount of strength needed to be a prison
guard was found unsupported by the evidence. 37 Because the defendants
failed to establish this correlation adequately, the Court did not consider
the merits of their assertion that a minimum level of strength is required in
order to be an effective prison guard.
In general, Dothard provides little that is new for plaintiffs challenging
objective job qualification standards under Title VII. Essentially, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that a minority group has been disproportionately
excluded from the defendant's work force as a result of the defendant's
hiring criteria. After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the de-
fendant may attempt to introduce additional statistical evidence to rebut
any inference of discrimination, but more likely the defendant will attempt
to prove that the hiring standards under challenge are a "business neces-
sity."
II. HAZELWOOD AND SUBJECTIVE HIRING PROCEDURES
Like plaintiffs challenging objective hiring criteria, plaintiffs challeng-
ing the subjective and discretionary aspect of a hiring procedure attempt to
justify an inference that the defendant has unlawfully discriminated. How-
ever, because no objective, clearly defined criteria are at issue, the plaintiff
cannot measure the impact of the defendant's hiring standards on minority
applicants. Therefore, the plaintiff must rely more heavily on inferences
based on statistics demonstrating that a protected class is underrepresented
in the defendant's work force." Such inferences may not be as strong as
those based on the kind of statistical proof offered to challenge objective
hiring standards, and therefore the plaintiff generally presents other,
nonstatistical evidence of discrimination to buttress a prima facie case. The
peculiar nature of this type of statistical proof provides the defendant with
additional methods of rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie showing of dis-
crimination. Hazelwood represents one of the Supreme Court's most signifi-
cant efforts to deal with the problems of proof involved in cases of this
kind.
Hazelwood involved a suit by the Attorney General of the United States
alleging that the Hazelwood School District and various of its officials were
engaged in a "pattern or practice" of employment discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII." The complaint alleged that the suburban St. Louis
" See id, at 431. See also Blumrosen, supra note 2, at 81-84.
" 433 U.S. at 331.
"See, e.g., Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307.
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970). This statute has since been amended, and authority to
bring "pattern or practice" suits against private employers has been transferred to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) 1 (Supp. V 1975). See Hazelwood,
433 U.S. at 301 n.l.
In "pattern or practice" suits, it is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that "the denial
of rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated,
routine, or of a generalized nature." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16, quoting Senator Hum-
phrey, 110 CONG. REC. 14270 (1964).
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school district had deliberately utilized employment procedures which dis-
proportionately excluded black applicants from teaching positions."
Hazelwood's hiring procedure was hightly subjective and invested "virtually
unlimited discretion" in individual school principals. 4 '
The Government's prima facie case was based on evidence regarding:
1) Hazelwood's history of racially discriminatory practices; 2) statistical dis-
parities between the percentage of black teachers employed in Hazelwood
and the percentage in nearby school districts; 3) the standardless and sub-
jective nature of the hiring procedures; and 4) fifty-five specific allegations
of discrimination against individual applicants for teaching positions. 42
Hazelwood "offered virtually no evidence in response," but denied that the
data introduced by the Government established a prima facie violation of
Title VII." The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri found for the defendants, its decision focusing particularly on the
Government's use of statistical proof. The court rejected the proposed
statistical comparison between the racial composition of Hazelwood's faculty
and the faculties of nearby school districts, and held that the relevant com-
parison was between the composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and its
student population.44 Therefore, figures showing a scarcity of black
teachers were found nonprobative because the percentage of black pupils
in Hazelwood was equally small." The court also found that the Govern-
ment's evidence regarding Hazelwood's subjective hiring procedure and the
school district's past practices did not buttress the statistical proof." In ad-
dition, the court held that the Government had failed to meet its burden of
proving discrimination in each of the fifty-five individual instances:"
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
rejecting the trial court's treatment of the statistical data. 48 The court ruled
that. the proper comparison was not between the percentage of black
teachers and black students in Hazelwood, but between black teachers in
Hazelwood and black teachers in the relevant labor market area. 49 Because
the Hazelwood School District drew its employees from the entire St. Louis
metropolitan area, the court selected that area as the relevant labor mar-
ket." The court examined 1970 Census data which showed that blacks
comprised 15.4% of the teachers in the St. Louis area, and compared these
figures with others showing that fewer than 2% of' the teachers in Hazel-
wood from 1972-1974 were black. This disparity, when "considered in light
of Hazelwood's hiring procedures,"" and the school district's history of dis-
Issues raised by pattern or practice suits, such as involved in Hazelwood, and class action
Title VII suits of the kind involved in Dothard, are substantially similar with regard to the
issues discussed in this note. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
10 United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
°' 433 U.S at 302,
41 392 F. Supp, at 1287.
43 433 U.S. at 303-04 & n.6.
44 392 F. Supp. at 1287.
" Id. at 1287-88.
Id. at 1288,
" Id. at 1289-90.
'" United States v, Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 814 (8th Cir. 1976).
4 E1 Id. at 813.
" Id. at 811 n.7.
5 ' Id. at 813.
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criminatory hiring," was found sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination." The court also held that the Government
had demonstrated that there was unlawful discrimination in sixteen indi-
vidual instances, and observed that these "buttress[ed]" the statistical
proof."
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the school district challenged the
Government's reliance on "undifferentiated work force statistics" as insuffi-
cient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. 55 The defendants
challenged this data on two grounds. First, they argued that the Govern-
ment should have introduced statistics regarding actual applicants for
teaching positions, since only such statistics could directly support the in-
ference that Hazelwood's subjective hiring procedure had been operated to
discriminate unlawfully. Second, the defendants contended that statistics
regarding the entire St.• Louis metropolitan area should not be used as a
standard of comparison, since that area was too large to warrant any infer-
ences with regard to Hazelwood's hiring policies. To support this latter
contention, the defendants asserted that the racially based, affirmative ac-
tion hiring programs of the city of St. Louis would distort any statistical es-
timates of the availability of black teachers in the area.
In discussing the sufficiency of the Government's statistical proof, the
Supreme Court referred to its recent decision in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States," in which the Court had rejected a challenge to
the usefulness of comparisons between general work force and population
statistics:
We noted in Teamsters] that statistics can be an important source
of proof in employment discrimination cases, since 'absent ex-
planation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory,
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the popu-
lation in the community from which employees are hired. Evi-
dence of long-lasting and gross disparity between the composi-
tion of a work force and that of the general population thus may
be significant even though . Title VII imposes no require-
ments that a work force mirror the general population.' ...
Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may
in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or
practice of discrimination."
According to the Court's reasoning in Teamsters, inferences of discrimina-
tion may arise when the racial composition of an employer's work force dif-
52
 Id.
55
 Id.
54
 Id.
55
 433 U.S. at 306 & n.12.
431 U.S. 324 (1977). See notes and text at notes 75-77 supra.
" Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08. See id. at 308 n.14, where the Court refers to Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), a habeas corpus action alleging unconstitutional dis-
crimination against Mexican-Americans in the selection of a grand jury. The Hazelwood Court
adopted the method outlined in Castaneda for determining the significance of statistical dis-
parities. The Court thus recognized that if a disparity is sufficiently "gross," it can, in and of
itself, provide the support for a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title
VII. 433 U.S. at 307-08.
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fers significantly from that of the "community from which employees are
hired."" In Hazelwood, therefore, the Court concluded that the court of
appeals was "correct in the view that a proper comparison was between the
racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition
of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor mar-
ket."59 Apparently, because this comparison adequately established a prima
facie case, the Court did not explictly impose any requirement that the
Government introduce statistics regarding the percentage of actual minor-
ity applicants who had been hired by the school district."
Nonetheless, the. Supreme Court chose to remand the case to the dis-
trict court for three reasons. First, the Court stated that further considera-
tion must be given to determining r the relevant labor market to which
Hazelwood's work force statistics should be compared. Because the district
court applied an erroneous standard at the original trial, the Court con-
cluded that the record used by the court of appeals was inadequate to pro-
vide the factual basis for defining the relevant labor market. The defen-
dants contended that the city of St. Louis should not be included in the
statistical analysis, because that city's affirmative action hiring policies artifi-
cally inflated any assessment of the availability of black teachers in the met-
ropolitan area." The Court held that this question should be resolved by
the district court, and in general that "a determination of the appropriate
comparative figures in this case will depend upon further evaluation by the
trial court." 52 In defining the relevant labor market area, the district court
was asked to consider four factors: 1) how long St. Louis' racially based hir-
ing policies have been in effect; 2) whether the city's policies have signifi-
cantly diverted black teachers from Hazelwood; 3) to what extent black
" 433 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting 7'eamsters, , 431 U.S. at 339 n.40).
" Id. at 308,
"See notes and text at notes 95-98 infra. Thotigh the Court examined recent hiring
statistics in an effort to determine Hazelwood's policies since the effective date of the Civil
Rights Act, see notes and text at notes 64-67 infra, the Court avoided imposing any require•
ment that the plaintiff introduce applicant statistics in order to establish a prima facie case.
This omission is particularly notable in light of the fact that the Court extensively discussed
other methods foe statistically establiihing a prima facie violation of Title VII. The implication
must be that applicant data is not generally required to establish a prima facie case.
Of course, the fact that the Court did not require the plaintiff to introduce statistics re-
garding actual applicants for teaching positions in Hazelwood does not mean that in future
cases a plaintiff may not introduce such figures to establish a prima facie case. Since cases in-
volving subjective hiring procedures are often concerned with the defendant's "disparate
treatment" of actual job applicants, see note 2 supra, applicant statistics might be highly proba-
tive in this context. See Kirkland v. State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.
1975), for an example of the use of "applicant flow" statistics to establish a prima facie case.
The phrase "applicant data" or "applicant flow statistics" as used in this note means a
statistical comparison of the number of minority applicants and the number of minority appli-
cants who were hired, i.e., the percentage of. actual minority applicants who were hired. 'This is
how the Court appears to use the phrase in Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308, ti,13. An alternative
meaning would suggest a comparison between the total number of applicants and the number
of minority applicants who were hired. See id. at 310, for an example of this type of statistical
analysis.
" Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 310-11. The issue whether St. Louis should be included in the
statistical analysis was highly significant. If the city was considered part of the relevant labor
market, then 15.4% of the qualified teachers in the market area were blatk. If the city was
excluded, then only 5.7% were black. Id. at 311.
"Id. at 310-11.
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teachers employed by St. Louis would "prefer employment in other dis-
tricts;" and 4) how other school districts near St. Louis have handled this
problem."
The second reason for remanding the case was that the court of ap-
peals had erred by "totally disregarding" the possibility that the Govern-
ment's prima facie showing of discrimination could be rebutted by "statis-
tics dealing with Hazelwood's hiring after it became subject to Title VII." 64
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court, observed that dis-
crimination by public employers did not become illegal under Title VII
until 1972. Therefore, he concluded, if the defendants could demonstrate
that the "claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring
rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination,"" the defendants could ef-
fectively rebut a prima facie case. There was some evidence in the record
that Hazelwood hired a higher percentage of black applicants for teaching
positions after 1972. 66 The district court was instructed to consider these
figures, since they might dispel any inference of illegal discrimination based
on a statistical analysis of the defendant's work force. The Court observed
that if the scarcity of black teachers in Hazelwood was due to pre- 1972 hir-
ing, then the school district had not violated Title VII. 67
The third reason for remanding the case was to permit the district
court to consider what percentage of black applicants had actually been
hired by Hazelwood. If such figures were available, Justice Stewart noted,
they would be "very relevant."" The Court did not impose any require-
ment that the Government introduce this evidence on remand, nor did the
decision describe precisely what the role of these "applicant flow" statistics
should be. The Court simply remanded the case for further examination of
these issues, and for "an ultimate determination of whether Hazelwood en-
gaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination" after the date
that Title VII became applicable to public employers."
In Hazelwood, the Court attempted to clarify the requirements for es-
tablishing and rebutting a prima facie violation of Title VII. The Court
recognized that both statistical and nonstatistical proof could be used to es-
tablish a prima facie case, but the decision focused on the importance of
the proper use of statistical evidence. In particular, the Court outlined
some of the factors which should enter into a determination of the relevant
labor market to which statistics regarding the racial composition of the de-
fendant's work force should be compared. The Court also considered pos-
sible methods of rebutting a prima facie case resting largely on this type of
statistical comparison.
63 Id.
" Id. at 309.
65
 Id. at 310 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360).
" Id.
" Id. at 309.
66 Id. at 308 n.13.
"Id. at 2744. Title VII became applicable to public employers on March 24, 1972.
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A. Establishing a Prima Fade Case
As in many Title VII suits which allege a "pattern or practice" 7° of
discrimination, the Government in Hazelwood relied heavily on statistics
demonstrating that the defendants' work force included disproportionately
few black employees. The Court observed that what statistics prove "obvi-
ously depends upon the figures to which they are compared." 71
 The Court
in Hazelwood determined that statistics regarding the racial composition of
the defendants' work force can be highly probative if properly compared to
the relevant labor market. The difficult issue was how to define the rele-
vant labor market, both geographically and in terms of estimating the
number of people qualified for the job in question.
In many instances, of course, the relevant market area is simply the
one "from which the employer draws its employees."" This was the defini-
tion employed by the court of appeals, in Hazelwood. However, the Supreme
Court recognized the possibility that certain communities from which the
defendant draws its employees may have to be excluded from the relevant
labor market, because hiring policies in those areas may distort statistical es-
timates of the availability of minority employees. 73 In Hazelwood there was a
possibility that work force statistics for the city of St. Louis should not have
been included in the relevant labor market, since the city's racially based
hiring program may have inflated the court of appeals' evaluation of the
presence of black teachers in the area. The Hazelwood decision suggests
some of the factors which must. go into an evaluation of the labor market
area when questions of this kind arise. In addition to examining where the
defendant's employees presently live, courts must investigate the availability
of minority employees currently working for other employers, how nearby
communities have handled minority recruitment, and whether racially
based hiring policies of other employers have diverted potential minority
applicants from the defendant."
If a geographical definition of the relevant labor market is difficult,
even more problematic in future cases might be estimating the number of
qualified personnel available. Treatment of this issue will vary substantially
from case to case. In discussing this problem, the Codrt referred to its deci-
sion in Teamsters," a Title VII suit alleging that a trucking company and a
large union were engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimi-
nation against black and Spanish-surnamed applicants. In that case, the
Government relied heavily on a statistical comparison between the racial
composition of segments of the defendant's work force and that of the
7° See note 39 supra.
7 ' 433 U.S. at 310. The Court here was specifically addressing the question of post-Act
hiring statistics.
72 Id. at 315 & n.2. (Stevens, f„ dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 534 17 .2d at 811 n.7). See
notes 57-59 supra.
"Id. at 311-12.	 •
74
 Id. The reverse situation may also arise in future cases. If the defendant pursues a
racially discriminatory recruitment policy, or if there is a noticeable exclusion of applicants
from nearby cities which have a large minority presence, the courts may have to include com-
munities in the relevant labor market area even when the defendant employs few people from
these communities. In such instances, courts may have to examine the distance which present
employees travel, the relative ease of commuting from nearby areas, and the reasonableness of
recruiting applicants from particular communities.
73
 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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general population in the area. As the Court noted in Hazelwood, this com-
parison was "highly probative, because the job skill there involved—the
ability to drive a truck—is one that many persons possess or can fairly
readily acquire."" But the Court recognized that when "special qualifica-
tions are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general popula-
tion (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the neces-
sary qualifications) may have little probative value.""
In Hazelwood the Government compared the racial composition of the
school district's teaching staff with the staffs of nearby communities. This
comparison, therefore, included only employed, and presumably qualified,
teachers rather than general population statistics. But if a future case in-
volved a challenge to the hiring policies of an entire industry, or if there
were strong reasons for believing that particular professions had pursued
racially exclusive policies across the board, estimates of the composition of
the qualified labor force based on the percentage of minorities hired by
nearby employers might be highly unreliable. In such instances, the courts
might have to examine relatively general population statistics even with re-
gard to positions requiring special qualifications, and nonstatistical evidence
of discrimination might take on special significance.
In spite of these difficulties with the concept of the "relevant labor
market," the decision in Hazelwood essentially reconfirms the ithportance of
statistical proof in employment discrimination suits, and the "liberal sub-
stantive standards for establishing a Title VII violation."'" The Court rec-
ognizes that general work force and population figures can provide sub-
stantial, and sometimes even exclusive," support for a prima facie case of
employment discrimination. This result is particularly justifiable when the
defendant has used a subjective hiring procedure, because if a prima facie
case cannot be founded largely on statistics it will often be impossible for
the plaintiff to determine how the defendant came to his hiring decisions.
As one commentator has noted:
Frequently, the 'real grounds' for finding liability are adduced
from evidence given by the employer's own witnesses.... The
plaintiff may guess at what the defendant did wrong and attack
these actions as discriminatory. His proof consists of statistics
showing a failure to hire or promote minority persons plus iden-
tification of the acts and practices by defendant that may have
produced the statistics. Full disclosure of the operations of de-
fendant may be forthcoming only during defendant's testimony,
and consequently this evidence will become available only if the
court requires defendant to present this proof; otherwise, defen-
dant will prevail on a motion for a directed verdict after plaintiff
has finished presenting his case. If the entire picture is presented
before the court, however, the operative factors that produced
the prima facie discrimination statistics may be identified and the
defendant's claims of justification with respect to each element in
" 433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
"Id.
78 Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" See note 57 supra.
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the situation evaluated. The use of statistics may thus be well
suited to securing a full judicial scrutiny of defendant's employ-
ment practices—a scrutiny necessary if Title VII is to be effec-
tive."
By this reasoning, the defendant should be required to come forward and
explain or defend his hiring decisions after the plaintiff has established that
there is a significant scarcity of minority employees in the defendant's work
force. Otherwise, employers who make hiring decisions in a subjective
manner will often be able to sidestep the commands of Title VII."'
The Hazelwood decision was concerned primarily with the use of statis-
tical evidence. However, as is often the case when a subjective procedure is
at issue, the plaintiff also introduced three types of nonstatistical proof: 1)
Hazelwood's history of discrimination; 2) individual instances of alleged
discrimination; and 3) the highly subjective nature of the school district's
hiring procedures. Each of these types of evidence is discussed below.
Although Title VII did not apply to public employers before 1972,
the Court in Hazelwood recognized that evidence of past discriminatory
practices can "in some circumstances support the inference that such dis-
crimination continued."" Justice Stewart noted that such an inference is
particularly warranted where "relevant aspects of the decisionmaking pro-
cess have] undergone little change." 83
 Thus, if the defendant employs the
same hiring procedure as before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act,
proof of previous racially exclusive policies can support the plaintiff's
prima facie case.
In addition to presenting evidence of past discrimination, the Hazel-
wood plaintiff introduced evidence showing that individual qualified black
applicants had been inexplicably rejected by the defendants. The court of
appeals found that sixteen sudi individual cases of discrimination "but-
tress[ed]" the plaintiff's statistical proof." The Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss what standards are to be applied to individual allegations of discrimi-
nation when a defendant is charged with a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII. Previously, the Court has held that to make
out a prima facie case in pattern or pi'actice suits the Government is not re-
quired to prove that "each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief
was a victim of the employer's discriminatory policv." 85 However, if the
Government attempts to support statistical proof of a pattern of discrimina-
tion with particular allegations, the Court has implied in recent cases that
the most effective way to do this is to establish a prima facie violation of
Title VII in each individual instance.'" The standard for doing so was set
" Biumrosen, supra note 2, at 91. Although a liberal application of discovery techniques
might assist in this area, see FED. R. CM P. 26-37, a full explanation Of the defendant's prac-
tices will likely be forthcoming only at trial.
" Cf. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20 (statistical disparities are often the "telltale sign
or purposeful discrimination").
82
 Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.15.
"Id. at 309-10 n.15.
" 534 F.2d at 813. Evidence regarding individual instances of' discrimination would be
particularly probative where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant. has been guilty of "dispa-
rate treatment" of a protected class of applicants. See note 2 SUPTa.
85 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
" See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 305, n.9 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339.
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forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green." Under the McDonnell Douglas
standard the plaintiff must show that a qualified applicant who was a
member of a protected class had unsuccessfully attempted to get a job for
which there was a vacancy, and for which the employer continued thereaf-
ter to seek applicants with similar qualifications." Although McDonnell
Douglas provided only the requirements for establishing a prima facie case
of employment discrimination in an individual, non-class action suit, the
Court in Hazelwood seemed to look to these standards in attempting to de-
termine if individual allegations of discrimination "buttress" statistical proof
of a pattern or practice of discrimination."
The plaintiff in Hazelwood also challenged the highly, subjective na-
ture of the school district's hiring procedures. The court of appeals found
these procedures particularly susceptible to discrimination." The Supreme
Court did not address the question whether employment practices which
vest a great deal of discretion in those who make the hiring decision are
especially vulnerable to abuses leading to Title VII violations. It has been
argued that the existence of a highly subjective hiring procedure . shotild
subject a defendant to particularly exacting scrutiny." If the Supreme
Court accepts this view, then much of the "fine tuning" of statistical proof
will not be required to establish a prima facie case wheri the defendant has
utilized a subjective hiring procedure. For the present, it is not certain
whether the Court believes that the fact that the defendant has employed a
highly discretionary hiring process, in and of itself, can lend support to the
plaintiff's prima facie showing of discrimination. Given the relatively lim-
ited statistical evidence available to plaintiff's in cases involving subjective
hiring procedures, and the fact that the defendant's vague hiring standards
often can be fully understood only by the defendant, the Court should im-
pose on the plaintiff in such instances a somewhat lighter burden with re-
spect to establishing a prima facie case.
B. Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defendant
must be given an opportunity for a rebuttal. Under the standard estab-
lished in Griggs, the defendant may rebut a prima facie case of employment
discrimination if he can demonstrate that the criteria used were necessary
for selecting employees capable of performing the job. 92 This defense may
also be available in cases involving subjective hiring procedures if the de-
fendant can come forward with legitimate, business related reasons why
particular applicants were not hired. However, mere assertions that the
employer attempted to hire the "best qualified applicants" will not be of
" 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
an Teamsters, 931 U.S. at 357-58.
" See note 39 supra.
RD 534 F.2d at 813. For a discussion of the problems involved with subjective hiring pro-
cedures, see Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
91 See Saracini v. Missouri Pac, R.R., 431 F..Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Ark. 1977), where the
district court stated that "Mt is well settled that 'subjective standards' applied to the evaluation
of employees, whether for hiring or promotion, are subjected to close scrutiny by the Courts."
Id. (citing, among others, the circuit court decision in Hazelwood).
92 Sec notes and text at notes 35-37 supra.
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value, nor will lists of vague discretionary principles which were allegedly
employed. 93 Because the defendants in Hazelwood used such vague and sub-
jective hiring standards, the defendant apparently could not effectively rely
on the "business necessity" defense.
It is more likely that employers with subjective hiring procedures will
present statistics of their own to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case. Be-
cause the plaintiff in such cases has generally relied heavily on a statistical
analysis of the racial composition of the defendant's work force, the defen-
dant can come forward with a variety of explanations or justifications which
deny the probative value of the plaintiff's statistics. Hazelwood discusses two
such defenses: 1) the defendant can attempt to show that the scarcity of
minority employees is a result of hiring which took place before the effec-
tive date of Title VII; or 2) the defendant can introduce statistics regarding
actual applicants for the position in question in an effort to demonstrate
that no discrimination has occurred. These two methods of rebutting a
prima facie case overlap somewhat, since the defendant may use recent ap-
plicant data to prove that there has been no post-Act discriminatory hiring.
Each of these defenses may also be more problematic than the Haze/wood
opinion suggests.
Hazelwood was remanded to the trial court in part because there was
some evidence in the record that the defendants had changed their ,policies
since 1972, the date Title VII became applicable to public employers, and
had hired a higher percentage of minority applicants in the ensuing years.
The Court gave the school district an opportunity to demonstrate that the
statistical disparity between the racial , composition of its teaching staff and
the teaching staffs of schools in the relevant labor market was a result of
pre-Act hiring."
93 See Teamsters, 931 U.S. at 342-43 n.24 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
632 (1972))..
94 433 U.S. at 309-10. The Hazelwood Court relied heavily on the reasoning of the
Teamsters decision in recognizing that only post-Act discrimination is unlawful under Title VII.
Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360). Teamsters involved an allegation of purposeful dis-
crimination by a private employer, whereas Hazelwood concerned purposeful discrimination by
a public employer. Because the fourteenth amendment does not apply to private employers,
pre-Act discrimination by them was not illegal under the Constitution nor under Title VII.
However, prior to 1972, when Title VII was extended to cover public employers, purposeful
job discrimination by state-run agencies was illegal under the fourteenth amendment. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), Although the Hazelwood Court noted in passing that
public employers were subject to the "command of the fourteenth amendment not to engage
in purposeful racial discrimination" even "before the extension of Title VII," 433 U.S. at 310
n.15, the Court's treatment of pre-Act hiring policies did not discuss the possibility that the
school district was engaged in unconstitutional discrimination prior to 1972. Instead, the
Hazelwood decision implies that a public employer can defend itself against a Title VII suit on
the grounds that the scarcity of minority employees on its work force is due to previous un-
constitutional hiring practices.
Although the plaintiff in Hazelwood did allege a constitutional violation, Brief for the
United States at 2, the Court was not called upon to confront this problem, because the focus of
the case was on Title VII violations and not on the fourteenth amendment, and the court of
appeals had restricted itself to findings tinder the statute. In addition, the standards for estab-
lishing discrimination differ substantially under Title VII and the fourteenth amendment, and
the Hazelwood plaintiff may not have assumed the greater burden of proof imposed under the
latter. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1977). If a future plaintiff were to com-
bine a Title VII claim with ,a claim under the fourteenth amendment, and if the plaintiff were
able to establish a history of pre-Act constitutional violations as a part of his case, the defen-
dant might not be able to rebut inferences of discrimination merely by demonstrating that the
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The Court also remanded the case so that the district court could
examine whether reliable "applicant flow" statistics were available. Most of
the Court's discussion of the usefulness of statistics regarding actual appli-
cants for Hazelwood's teaching positions is found in footnotes to the deci-
sion.95
 These footnotes are somewhat cryptic in their discussion of appli-
cant data. The Court notes that "applicant flow" statistics might be "very
relevant,"" but the decision does not make clear whether such data should
be introduced to establish or to rebut a prima facie case. Because the deci-
sion avoids imposing any requirement that the plaintiff introduce this evi-
dence as a part of a prima facie case, the implication, supported by the
concurring and dissenting opinions, seems to be that applicant data will
often be introduced as a rebuttal to the plaintiff's case." Since Title VII
suits involving subjective hiring procedures are generally concerned with
the defendant's treatment of actual job applicants," such statistics can be
highly useful in this context. However, an analysis of applicant statistics
might be of somewhat less value than the Court suggests. In particular, the
assumption that the employer had no role in determining the composition
of the applicant pool is often unwarranted. Although the defendant has no
objective job qualification standards which would deter potential minority
applicants, past discriminatory practices may have discouraged members of
minority groups from applying for jobs with the defendant. As a result, the
racial composition of the applicant pool can be at least partially the product
of the defendant's past discriminatory behavior.
This issue was disaissed by the Teamsters Court in the context of pos-
sible relief for non-applicants after a violation of Title VII had been estab-
lished. The Court observed:
The effects of and the injuries suffered from discriminatory
employment practices are not always confined to those who were
expressly denied a requested employment opportunity.... [A
discriminatory message can be communicated] by an employer's
actual practices—by his consistent discriminatory treatment of
actual applicants, by the manner in which he publicizes vacancies,
his recruitment techniques, his responses to casual or tentative
inquiries, and even by the racial and ethnic composition of that
part of his workforce from which he has discriminatorily
excluded members of minority groups."
scarcity of minorities on his work force is a result of pre-1972 hiring. In general, the relation-
ship between Title VII and the fourteenth amendment in this context will require further
treatment by the courts.
For an excellent survey of recent Supreme Court decisions and a fruitful discussion of
the developing concept of "purposeful" discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, see
Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington
v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy and Williamsburgh, 12 HAM'. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725
(1977).
95
 433 U.S. at 308-16 nn.13, 16 & 21.
"id. at 308 n.13.
97
 See id. at 347-48 (White, J., concurring); id. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Plaintiffs challenging the subjective aspect of a hiring procedure generally proceed
under a "disparate treatment" theory. See note 2 supra.
"431 U.S. at 365.
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In light of this reasoning in Teamsters, which also involved a subjective hir-
ing procedure, the Court's suggestions in Hazelwood regarding the useful-
ness of applicant statistics should be narrowly interpreted. When an em-
ployer has a history of discriminatory recruitment and hiring, a statistical
analysis of the applicant pool may not effectively rebut inferences of dis-
crimination based on work force statistics. At the very least, the plaintiff
should be permitted to demonstrate that applicant data is not reliable be-
cause members of minority groups were dissuaded from applying for the
job in question due to the defendant's past discriminatory practices. For
example, the defendants in Hazelwood had recruited teachers only at col-
leges attended primarily by white students, and had ignored two teachers'
colleges with a predominately black enrollment.'" This practice might have
discouraged potential black applicants, or, in a subtler way, might have es-
tablished patterns of hiring which encouraged students at certain colleges
to apply for teaching positions in Hazelwood while discouraging others. In
light of this fact, the Court's suggestion that statistics regarding black appli-
cants would be of substantial value must be read with caution.
The decision in Hazelwood highlights several of the peculiar problems
of cases involving highly subjective hiring procedures. Because the plaintiff
must rely heavily on inferences based on the scarcity of minority employees
in the defendant's work force, greater care must be taken in determining
the "relevant labor market" to be used in a comparison with work force
statistics: In addition, the plaintiff often must introduce nonstatistical evi-
dence of discrimination to buttress the statistical proof. Since no clearly de-
fined hiring criteria are at issue, the plaintiff generally is unable to intro-
duce additional statistics which establish the connection between the defen-
dant's hiring practices and the scarcity of minority employees in the defen-
dant's work force. As a result, the defendant can effectively rebut a prima
facie case by introducing statistics of its own which explain why minority
groups are underrepresented.
III. COMPARISON OF HAZELWOODAND DOTHARD
The Supreme Court decisions in Dothard and Hazelwood were handed
down on the same day, were drafted by the same Justice, and arose under
the same statute. It is, understandable, then, that the two cases are similar
in many respects. In both decisions the Court emphasized that the initial
burden on the plaintiff in a Title VII' is to justify an inference that the
defendant has been guilty of unlawful discrimination. In both cases, the
Court permitted relatively general statistical comparisons to help establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination. In both decisions, after a
prima facie violation had been demonstrated, the burden shifted to the
employer to rebut the inference that his hiring practices were illegally dis-
criminatory.
A comparison of Dothard and Hazelwood also suggests substantial dif-
ferences between the Court's treatment of cases involving objective job
qualification standards and those dealing with subjective hiring procedures.
Although plaintiffs challenging objective criteria generally attempt to dem-
onstrate a scarcity of minority employees in the defendant's work force, the
"0 433 U.S. at 303 & n.4.
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emphasis of the plaintiff's prima facie case must be on the impact of the
challenged job qualification standard on the pool of potential applicants.
The plaintiff's burden is, to demonstrate that minority applicants have been
disproportionately screened out by the defendant's hiring standards. Since
objective criteria are clearly defined, a statistical analysis of the impact of
the challenged job qualification standard on the general population can be
highly probative. To rebut a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion, the defendant may challenge the reliability of the statistics offered,
but usually must attempt to establish that the job qualification standards are
necessary for effective job performance.
On the other hand, plaintiffs who challenge the subjective and discre-
tionary aspect of a hiring procedure must rely more heavily on inferences
of discrimination based on the scarcity of minority employees on the de-
fendant's work force. A significant disparity"" between the racial composi-
tion of the defendant's work force and that of the relevant labor market
can constitute much, or even all, of the foundation for a prima facie case.
The plaintiff can support this statistical proof by introducing other evi-
dence of, for example, the employer's history of discrimination, individual
allegations of Title VII violations, or possibly the suspect nature of the hir-
ing procedure itself. The plaintiff's heavy reliance on work force statistics
permits the defendant to rebut a prima facie case by introducir4 figures of
his own to demonstrate that no post-Act discrimination has occurred, or to
introduce data showing that an adequate percentage of actual minority ap-
plicants have been hired. However, the value of this latter method of proof
remains in doubt.'°2
CONCLUSION
• The Supreme Court decisions in Dothard and Hazelwood underline the
importance of statistical proof in establishing a prima facie violation of
Title VII. Though the two decisions raise some unresolved questions, the
Court's recognition that Title VII plaintiffs must often rely heavily on
statistical evidence represents a significant step toward bringing the proof
requirements of Title VII' in line with its ultimate purpose: "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities." 103
BENJAMIN S. WOLF
1 °' See note 57 supra.
102 See notes and text at notes 95-100 supra.
' 03 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
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